Illiberal Policy Frames and Crisis Exploitation in Contemporary Democracies

The rise of illiberal politics within formally democratic systems has emerged as one of the most pressing challenges to liberal democracy in the twenty-first century (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018; Mounk, 2018). Unlike authoritarian regimes that openly reject democratic principles, illiberal democracies maintain the façade of electoral competition while systematically undermining the checks and balances, civil liberties, and pluralistic norms that constitute the substance of liberal democratic governance (Zakaria, 1997). Central to this phenomenon is the deployment of what we term "illiberal policy frames" (IPFs)—discursive and legislative strategies that justify restrictions on rights, concentration of executive power, and the weakening of independent institutions through appeals to security, traditional values, or national sovereignty (Bonikowski, 2017; Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2017).

Understanding how and when political actors employ IPFs requires examining the contextual factors that enable their successful deployment. While some scholars emphasize the role of populist ideology and cultural backlash in driving illiberal politics (Norris & Inglehart, 2019), others point to institutional weaknesses and the strategic calculations of political elites (Bermeo, 2016). We understand IPF usage as a strategic and variable response to perceived threats that can be measured and analysed across contexts. Therefore, our research tests whether legislators from across the democratic spectrum use crises to perpetuate illiberalism. Our central hypothesis in this context is crisis exploitation theory. By challenging existing institutional routines, policy instruments, and agendas (Alink et al., 2001), crises present leaders with the opportunity to further their ideological aims while their constituencies are rattled by uncertainty.

This framework builds upon established scholarship on crisis politics and democratic backsliding. Scholars have long recognized that emergencies create windows of opportunity for political change, as the normal constraints of democratic deliberation give way to demands for swift executive action (Agamben, 2005; Scheppele, 2004). However, the literature has been less attentive to how crises specifically enable the advancement of illiberal agendas. Recent events, from the 2015 refugee crisis in Europe to the COVID-19 pandemic, have demonstrated that diverse political actors—not only far-right populists but also mainstream conservative and even centrist parties—have invoked emergency circumstances to justify measures that expand executive power, restrict civil liberties, and target minority populations (Grogan & Weinstein, 2023; Lührmann & Rooney, 2021).

The strategic deployment of IPFs during crises follows identifiable patterns. First, political entrepreneurs frame the crisis in existential terms, portraying it as a threat to the nation's survival, cultural identity, or social cohesion (Moffitt, 2015). This threat construction serves to elevate the stakes beyond ordinary political contestation and to justify extraordinary measures. Second, they position themselves as the sole protectors capable of defending the nation against this threat, while casting opponents, independent institutions, or civil society organizations as obstacles to effective crisis management (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008). Third, they leverage the urgency of the crisis to bypass normal legislative procedures, sideline oversight mechanisms, and implement policies that would face greater resistance under routine conditions (Bugarič, 2019).


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