Parliamentary questions constitute a fundamental mechanism through which legislative bodies exercise oversight over executive actions and hold governments accountable. Across democratic systems, the institution of parliamentary questioning serves multiple functions: it enables legislators to extract information from the executive branch, provides a platform for opposition parties to challenge government policies, and offers opportunities for MPs to represent constituent interests on the parliamentary floor (Martin, 2011; Russo & Wiberg, 2010). The procedural rules governing these questions significantly shape their effectiveness as accountability instruments, as institutional design determines who can ask questions, which topics can be raised, and how executive responses are structured and delivered (Wiberg, 1995). Understanding these procedural frameworks is therefore essential to assessing the actual functioning of parliamentary oversight in any given political system.
Our research strategy was informed by the rules and conventions governing parliamentary questioning in Hungary. According to these rules, parliamentary questions can be written or oral. Written questions must be answered in writing in 30 days. The three types of oral question – interpellations, 'regular' questions, urgent questions – are presented in a plenary session of the National Assembly. Each MP has the right to introduce various question types; agenda access, however, is controlled by parliamentary and party group leadership for most parliamentary question types.
The distinction between written and oral questions reflects different strategic purposes and institutional logics within parliamentary systems. Written questions typically allow for more detailed information-gathering and create a permanent record that can be referenced in future debates or committee work (Franklin & Norton, 1993). Oral questions, by contrast, offer visibility and immediate political impact, enabling MPs to publicly challenge ministers and generate media attention for particular issues (Rozenberg & Martin, 2011). The degree to which party leadership controls access to oral question time has significant implications for backbench autonomy and the diversity of issues raised in parliamentary debate, with more centralized systems potentially limiting the range of topics subjected to public scrutiny.
These procedural variations ultimately affect the balance of power between legislature and executive, as well as between government and opposition. Systems that grant individual MPs greater autonomy in question-asking tend to produce more diverse oversight patterns and may strengthen parliamentary independence (Saalfeld, 2000). Conversely, when party leadership exercises tight control over parliamentary questions, these instruments may function primarily as coordinated opposition strategies rather than as tools for genuine information-gathering or individual representation (Jensen, Proksch, & Slapin, 2013). Analyzing the specific rules governing parliamentary questions therefore provides crucial insights into the broader dynamics of democratic accountability and legislative-executive relations.

References
Franklin, M., & Norton, P. (1993). Parliamentary Questions. Oxford University Press.
Jensen, C. B., Proksch, S.-O., & Slapin, J. B. (2013). Parliamentary questions, oversight, and national opposition status in the European Parliament. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 38(2), 259-282.
Martin, S. (2011). Parliamentary questions, the behaviour of legislators, and the function of legislatures. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 17(3), 259-270.
Rozenberg, O., & Martin, S. (2011). Questioning parliamentary questions. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 17(3), 394-404.
Russo, F., & Wiberg, M. (2010). Parliamentary questioning in 17 European parliaments: Some steps towards comparison. The Journal of Legislative Studies, 16(2), 215-232.
Saalfeld, T. (2000). Members of parliament and governments in western Europe: Agency relations and problems of oversight. European Journal of Political Research, 37(3), 353-376.
Wiberg, M. (1995). Parliamentary questioning: Control by communication? In H. Döring (Ed.), Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe (pp. 179-222). St. Martin's Press.